A(k, s) halting can be interpreted as "it is not true that C_s() does not halt" as opposed to "it is false that C_s() does not halt." Needles to say this implies that the false sentences are a proper subset of the sentences that are not true.
The Halting Theorem
Program A() enables us to determine when a computation does not halt. Determining when a computation does halt can be accomplished with an emulator B(n, m), which simply halts when C_n(m) halts. Thus a complete decider H() would consists of A() and B() running in parallel. Symbolically we can express this as
H(n, m) = A(n, m) || B(n, m)
When A() halts H() will return 0, when B() halts H() will return 1. We do not need to worry unduly about the cases when the computation does halt though.
The postulated decider H() will tell us about all the cases when a computation does halt and about some of the cases when it does not. Quite powerful deciders can be constructed. An example would an equivalent of the proof predicate in PA. 4 ) Such a decider would probably tell us everything we ever wanted to know about halting and more, but it will not tell us all.
So says the Halting Theorem, which we will now briefly recapitulate.
The Halting Theorem basically states that A() cannot determine that C_s() does not halt. The argument might go as follows: First assume that C_s() halts. Then, by the Recursion Theorem, C_k(s) halts implying that C_s() does not halt. A contradiction. So C_s() does not halt. Now assume that A(s, *) halts. Then C_k(s) halts, but then C_s() halts. Another contradiction. So A(s, *) does not halt. Therefore A() cannot prove that C_s() does not halt.
QED.
For a sketch of A() please see Appendix B.
4 More on this on page 11. What do we make out of this? Perhaps the best way to think about it is that "C_k(s) halts" is false, but "C_s() halts" is not true. ) that from the point of view of our hypothetical halting decider H() the fate of R() is unknown. The best we can do is to say that H() cannot prove that R() halts. We can capture these observations in a table.
Tripartition
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R() T(r)
determined to halt determined to halt not determined to halt determined not to halt determined not to halt determined not to halt halt, and it does not, how can you possibly say that it will not halt?
The Thesis Restated
The thesis can be restated as follows. Let H(n, m) be a program with the following properties: The Halting Theorem makes a case for non-bivalent logic. The fallacy is conflating ~T and F in our minds under the vague umbrella "does not halt." But when we make it explicit that we mean "~T('C_s() halts')" then a determination can be made that this proposition is true. No infinite hierarchies of omegas are necessary.
The Liar Paradox
There is a similarity between what has been said above and Gaifman's resolution of the Liar Paradox. The following is an almost verbatim paraphrase of a few paragraphs from Haim Gaifman's paper. (Gaifman, 2000, p. 3) It may be worth the exercise. The two-line puzzle has been altered, emphases added.
The following two-line puzzle will serve as our example.
Line 1: This sentence is not true. Line 2: "This sentence is not true" is not true.
By a well-worn argument the sentence on line 1 is not true (if the sentence is true, then it is not true). . . . . . Let us take a closer look at the failure of the line 1 sentence. The standard evaluation rule for a sentence of the form 'The sentence X is true' is roughly this:
(*) Go to the sentence X and evaluate it. If that sentence is true, so is 'The sentence X is true' , else the latter is false.
To get the truth-value of the negated sentence ('The sentence X is not true') we should apply (*) and follow it up by applying the rule for negation (where the latter step is supposed to reverse the truth-value). In the case of the line 1 sentence, the evaluation does not terminate; the sentence sends us back to the starting point. Thus, we get a closed loop. The "go-to" command makes the referring of 'The sentence ...' operationally explicit. . . . . . The closed loop yields a non-terminating evaluation, and for this reason alone the sentence is not true. . . . . .
The conclusion that the line 1 sentence is not true reflects the realization that the straightforward implementation of (*) fails. It is expressed by using sentences different from the one on line 1, e.g. the one on line 2. The other sentences succeed because they are external to the loop produced by the first one. We can already see how different sentences mark different levels. The first sentence is in the loop, the second is, in a sense, about it. This is perfectly sound logic! The first thing we observe is that in case of the first sentence there is a truth value gap. The second sentence is about the first sentence. The first one is neither true nor false. Then in particular it is not true, and that is what the second sentence says. Therefore the second sentence is true. So even though the first sentence it neither true nor false the second one is true. But note that the grammatical subjects of both sentences have the same referent (the sentence on line 1) and both sentences use the same predicate ('not true'). Consider the following pair: This sentence is not true <=/=> "This sentence is not true" is not true Secondly, the proof by contradiction works differently. If the assumption P yields a contradiction then the conclusion is merely ~T(P), not necessarily F(P).
One way to interpret the loop in which line 1 sentence gets stuck is to say that the evaluation procedure is unable to determine that the sentence is not true. However the procedure is able to determine that second sentence is true.
Logic & Arithmetic
Now let us try to bring both perspectives together. The diagonal lemma states:
For any theory T that contains PA, and for any formula φ(x), there exists a sentence ψ such that
where <#ψ#> is the Gödel number of ψ. ( 
The left side of the equivalence is Gödel's sentence:
~(∃x)(∃y)(Prf(x,y) & This(y)) (G) If its Gödel number is m, then This() is satisfied only by m [Appendix C.]
It is not difficult to show that Gödel's sentence is vacuous. Substitute m for y in G: 
certainly is true! Thus K is not equal to G, but rather (3.1) is mutual necessitation. We can summarize these observations in a table that looks remarkably similar to We see that in some sense the existence of x is equivalent to program halting. In particular if "(∃x)P(x)" is true then Prog_P() halts. If "(∃x)P(x)" is false then Prog_P() does not halt. What if "(∃x)P(x)" is ~(T v F)? Then it is not true that Prog_P() halts. But if "(∃x)P(x)" is ~(T v F) then neither "(∃x)P(x)" nor "~(∃x)P(x)" are provable, i.e. no sound system will either prove or disprove them. So in particular if "(∃x)P(x)" is not provable then it is not provable that Prog_P() halts. We can apply these observations to G, K, C_s(), C_k(s): 
There is a Turing machine R that computes a number r, such that r = T(<R>).
[<R> is the description of R; you can think of it as a Turing machine specification or source code of a program; we are using "Turing machine" and "program" interchangeably.]
R is a machine that can obtain its own description, inspect or execute itself.
This particular formulation of the Recursion Theorem and the proof loosely follow Sipser 
APPENDIX C: Gödel's Sentence
Here is a simplified derivation of Gödel's sentence. In Peano Arithmetic there exists a decidable relation Diag(w,y) such that if w is the Gödel number of a formula with one free variable then y is the Gödel number of the formula obtained from w by substituting (the numeral of) the Gödel number of w for the free variable in w. Further let Prf(x,y) be a predicate such that x is the Gödel number of a sequence that is a proof of the sentence with Gödel number y. Then consider the formula ~(∃x)(∃y) (Prf(x,y) & Diag(w,y) ) (U) with one free variable w. Let the constant k be the Gödel number of U. We substitute k for the free variable w in U. We obtain
~(∃x)(∃y)(Prf(x,y) & Diag(k,y))
As a result of this construction Diag(k,y) is satisfied only by the Gödel number of G. (Newberry, 2016) Instead of 'Diag(k,y)' we will write 'This(y)', and obtain
~(∃x)(∃y)(Prf(x,y) & This(y))
We are not trying to show how G was derived; we are rather working with the final product, and the predicate This() makes it explicit that the sentence is referring to itself.
